It is an opportune
time to revisit the lessons of EDSA 2 given the aggressive stance of former
president Estrada's to revive his political career by running for the mayoral
race of Manila City in May 2013 elections. The Laquian's account of their first
hand experience with the Estrada administration captures the reasons behind the
fall of the ill-fated president. In less than 2 years, Estrada squandered the people's trust. Just like Marcos, he spent his time
amassing wealth and strengthening his relations with his multiple families and
cronies. EDSA 2, although later discredited by former Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's
numerous scandals, salvaged the country from the pits of demoralization.
The 10-chapter volume
is a chronicle of the short-lived service of the Laquians as advisers to the
president. Aprodicio Laquian served as the chief of staff but was unduly
relieved from office due to what he considered as "irresponsible statements".
He apologized for the following remarks he made during the Manila Overseas
Press Club on March 2000.
- ''Now,
another responsibility that I am supposed to have is to help the
President's time management. That, to me, is almost mission impossible
because the President is used to be the superstar. He is the only
superstar in the Palace. In fact one time I told him: Mr. President may
naghihintay. He told me: the President is always on time, the guests are
early. So ano magagawa mo . . . we try to organize this day, and this
night and this morning and so on. Whether he's . . . sleepy because he was
with other friends . . ."
- ''Some
people are wondering: You know, Rod Laquian and his wife are entitled to
socialized housing. Why are they staying in Arlegui? I tell you, so that
we can be available to the President 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It's
not unusual to get a phone call from the Palace at two in the morning and
he says '. . . kailangan ito dito' and you go."
- "It
is not unusual to be in the Ang
Pangulo, the presidential yacht, and you know feeling so good you know
may sarili kaming kuwarto doon sa aming pagtulog but three o'clock in the
morning kumanta ka daw ''Maalaala Mo Kaya.''
- ''It's
the best thing...at four o'clock in the morning I'm the only sober person.
. .and if this is in Canada I will be the designated driver. I will be the
one taking them to their beds and so on. So, at least if there is the one
person who is sober in the room who would be able to take all of these
things that were signed and then hide them in my record book, then the
decision-making will probably be -- in the beautiful light of the morning
--- be very rational.''
Prod clarified that
he never saw the president drunk and he
sincerely delivered his public apology and tendered his "irrevocable resignation".
This act confirmed the man's commitment to integrity and delicadeza. He unintentionally (but factually) sullied the name of
the president. Estrada found it easy to ease him out from office mainly because
he was just a "spare tire", a product
of political accommodation. The Laquians were personally recommended by Dr. Raul
De Guzman, Erap's brother-in-law and his presidential adviser on development
and administration, to help the office of the president. Prod, however, was
given an office (chief of staff) which overlaps with the functions of the
Executive Secretary (Ronaldo Zamora) and the Presidential Management Staff
(Lenny de Jesus)
The first two
chapters highlight the rise to power of the charismatic president (Champion of
the Poor and The People's Court). The Estrada administration became so
overconfident due to massive popular support. It overestimated the people's willingness to
support unpopular policies. Erap failed that much because he presented himself
as a leader who can deliver that much. Filipinos got frustrated over his
explicit promises ("walang kama-kamag-anak, walang
kaibi-kaibigan") not to be corrupt.
Lo and behold, the promising inaugural speech turned out to be a movie script.
The people believed the president but he violated their trust big time.
The Role of Political Culture
The authors'
academic character makes it essential to have a clear grasp of the political culture of the country and how it impinges on the leadership predilections
of Erap. The fall of his administration should be situated within the large
political and cultural context of the country. Politicians in the country
exhibit fatalistic tendencies, always desire to save "face" and would
give primacy to the interests of their families, clans and factions. The wide
gap between the rich and the poor
resulted in the weak implementation of the rule of law, double standard of
justice and the strong military role in the country's political life. The
country's political culture augur well for the rise of leaders like Estrada.
There is a need to distinguish
the ideal politics (no-nonsense leadership) from the elitist, hard-boiled model
which Erap embraced. The president is categorized as a positive-passive leader
who is compliant and easily manipulated due to strong need to be loved and
admired. The tremendous powers and prerogative of the presidency were not
widely used by Erap which resulted in disarrayed government programs. Spin
doctors were hired to establish his reputation and deodorize the negative news hurled
against his office. He heeded to the whispered counsel (bulong) of his cronies
who, in one way or another, impinged on his policies.
The authors attributed
to the troika of "Ms" the downfall of the regime: money, mistresses and
mansions. The role of the watchdog media helped exposed the veiled luxurious
lifestyle of the president. Laquians consider this incongruent to the pro-poor
rhetoric of the Estrada presidency. They witnessed the opulent lifestyle of the
president from the use of his official yacht, Ang
Pangulo, to the decoration of his Malacanang residence.
Psychological Underpinnings (from San Juan to Malacanang)
Chapter 4 presents
an in-depth look at the pyschological rationale of the president's leadership
style, which can be gleaned from his rebellious childhood, lavish stardom and political
stint from being San Juan Mayor up to his entry to Malacanang. The young Estrada
found it difficult to compete against his elder brothers, Paula and Emilio, and
his elder sisters, Pilarica and Patrocinio. Erap's brothers were all handsome
and fair-skinned mestizons while the ladies were very religious, well-behaved
and got good academic grades. An interview with the president's close relatives
and friends revealed that he identified himself with the "masa"
because of his failure to get close to his immediate family. Erap found his
identity and sense of self in the company of poor boys from a slum area in San
Juan. His exposure to gang wars and urban poor rumble made him as a
"toughie".
Erap was considered
by his parents as the "black sheep" of the clan due to several brawls
he got involved into (including his fight with an American student at the Ateneo
boys toilet). His insecurities led him to enter the showbiz industry for fame
and fortune. His mother prohibited him from using the Ejercito family name for
fear of another disgrace. Hence, the screen name "Joseph Estrada" was
popularized--the man who lived a lifestyle that involved heavy drinking,
gambling and womanizing. This observation is complemented by interesting
trivias offered by the authors. The president had an insatiable fetish for coats
and jackets. He did not mind spending a lot of money for one he fancied. Erap's
signature wristband covers a scar from samurai wound he got in a movie sword
fight. When former president Marcos asked him what support he would like to
have for the people of San Juan City (as a political gratis), Erap requested for
a parcel of land in Taytay where he relocated many San Juan squatter residents.
For some psychologists, Erap was considered bright and has a phenomenal ability
to remember names, backgrounds and specific events. He, however, has a low
capacity to analyze problem in an "objective, systematic and rational
manner" (pp. 107).
The President and the Snake Pit
Chapters 5 and 6 detonate
the political bombshells. They present the complex and never-before-seen character
of the "snake pit", that is, Malacanang. It is not unusual for Prod to
have at most 4 hours sleep due to the demands of his job---from reading daily
newspapers to fixing the president's schedule. He likewise witnessed the
jarring view of how Erap treated his subordinates in a domineering and bullying
way. This trained Erap's secretaries to be "ultra-sensitive" to his
moods. He is known to "baptize" people with crude and hurting names
(i.e. Kalbo for baldy, Pandak for short one and BIR (Babaeng Inurungan ng Regla
for old maids). One major liability was Erap's aggressive decision-making. His ego and pride took control of him. He stopped listening
to his well-meaning advisers who truly desired him to pursue good governance.
Prod once said that
living in a "snake pit" would make him as a "snake
charmer." His efforts to get the house in order failed when he clashed
with the PMS chief, Lenny de Jesus, also called as the Dragon (Crying) Lady of
the palace. At many times, he was not comfortable with the micro-management
practices (completed staff work) of Leny--from determining who will ride the
presidential plane up to making scripts for cabinet meetings. The President
acted as a mere "talking head" in these sessions. Several controversies
were hurled against the Laquian couple including the accusation that they were
trying to establish their sub-kingdom in the palace that could undermine the
job of Rod Reyes, the Press Secretary and the PMS chief.
Estrada may have
possessed the patriotism and nationalism that the Filipino people needed during
the turbulent years of the country's history. Nonetheless, his political experience
as a city mayor, senator and Vice-President never provided him enough technical
know-how to lead the country (pp. 102-103). He is known to despise long speeches
and meetings. He gets easily bored with details of a plan. He rarely
participated in serious intellectual discussion. Erap behaved and spoke like
your normal urban poor guy with his "green jokes" and under the belt,
sexist remarks. He lacked the internal moral compass to be a national symbol of
good values. His inability to control his appetites proved to be a liability. Erap
was a self-indulging man who loved to eat high-cholesterol foods (i.e. lechon
and pochero). He had poor work habits and manifested aversion to long hour is
focused, serious work. His sexual appetite was legendary as attested by his
numerous mistresses and dozen children. The authors mentioned in one instance,
how Loi Ejercito remained calm and civil despite the abusive remarks of her
husband. They praised Loi for her temperance for being the "emotional
punching bag" of the president.
The President never
had a coherent program of governance for the first 100 days. Much of time were spent
appointing people to more than 6,000 positions in the government and renovation
of infrastructures to be used by the chief executive. The president had "only the vaguest
notion of what he wanted to do." (pp. 137). He hired more than 30
presidential assistants with full-time salaries, more than 20 consultants and
many informal "calling card" presidential assistants. All of them
were appointed due to political backers who helped Estrada win the 1998
elections.
Estrada was
notorious for being tardy in gracing important meetings. His mood swings got the better
of him. Hence, his cabinet secretaries were always on their toes for any last
minute changes in his itinerary (i.e. deliver the speech of
president). Malacanang would always argue that the "president was never
late, the people were early." He was not
given enough honeymoon period by the media. From day one, he was lambasted by
the press. Consequently, Erap retaliated by commanding his friends to withdraw
their advertisements from broadsheets which magnified his political
incompetence (i.e. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Times). The move by the Office of Executive Secretary to amend the ways of the
"undisciplined" leader came too late and was overtaken by the actions of a critical mass of people who
desired Estrada to vacate Malacanang.
Overall, the
president's leadership style can be summarized as follows (pp. 168-169): 1) He
lacked an overall direction in his administration; 2) He disdained the day-to-day
tasks of running a government; 3) He was not a consultative decision-maker; 4)
He made decisions with incomplete information, he often made mistakes; 5) Erap
mixed official and personal affairs in his public decision-making; and 5) He
failed to use the considerable professional and technical resources in PMS, the
Office of the Executive Secretary and other units inside Malacanang to assist
him.
Estrada never fully
understood his role as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He found it
difficult to identify with the diciplined and polished character of the
military. Erap was not fond of the military and the "generals did not like
him" (pp. 212). The personal decision-making of the president did not
augur well to the objective, institutional rules of the institution. This could
be a reason why General Angelo Reyes, then AFP Chief of Staff, easily declared,
during EDSA 2, his withdrawal of support to the president, justifying his
action as mere compliance to Article 2, section 3 of the Constitution,
which states that the military should protect the state and its people.
The "Barkada" Factor
Before leaving for
Canada, Prod had a last word for the president: "Bayad na po kayo" referring to his constant admonition to the
president to stop giving favors to his cronies and sycophants (sipsip). During
the president's inaugural address, the couple was requested by Erap's brother
and mother to help the president keep away from the bad influence of his
political and business peers. But for the Laquians, it was next to impossible
to carry out the task mainly because of Estrada's sensitivity and volatile
temperament whenever people talk ill of his friends. In a country where
political leaders protect their family's interest, Erap was an exponential and
classic example since he has more than one family.
Several political
actors competed for the ears of the president. Basically, he nurtured five
groups--his bosom buddies (i.e. FPJ, Reli German and Ducky Paredes), Chinoy
business cronies (i.e. Atong Ang, Lucio Tan, Mark Jimenez), political and
religious allies (i.e. Maceda, Angara, Velarde of El Shaddai), technocrats of
his administration (i.e. Pardo of DTI, Diokno and Medalla of UP School of
Economics) and family members. Due to divergent interests, political clashes
are normal among the president's men, especially between Ronaldo Zamora
(Executive Secretary) and Robert Aventajado, Erap's kumpadre and mobilizer for
JEEP, the president's link to civil society organizations. The term "midnight cabinet" was coined, which later surfaced in the media because of the stubborn habit of president's allies
and close friends to visit Malacanang at the wee hours of the night. Of all the
groups, it was the technocrat circle which truly desired to help the president
in his pro-poor programs.
Of Poverty and Civil Society
Chapter 8 provides a
good scan of poverty studies in the
country (pp. 229-240). The poor in urban centers and the countryside comprised
the bulk of votes which catapulted Erap into power. Relationship of the president
with the Philippine Left, however, proved to be adversarial. Communists
considered Erap as a stooge of the Americans and somehow linked him to the
former dictator. Not surprisingly, the cultural elites never supported the
president who they considered as an intellectually-challenged buffoon. Although
Erap presented himself as pro-market at the start of his administration, the
Makati Business Club aligned themselves against him due to his proclivity to
pursue pro-poor, anti-business programs. As for his relationship with the
Catholic Church, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin openly condemned Erap's
womanizing and gambling activities. Monsignor Pedro Quitoria of the influential
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) said in a statement that
"If you cannot manage your personal life, how can you manage the life of a
country?"
Chapter 9 presents
the recent literature on the civil society organizations in the country (pp.
263-278). This is juxtaposed with Estrada's JEEP (Justice, Economy, Environment
and Peace) Program headed by Aventajado. The initiative attracted former
Left-wing personalities and intellectuals like Edicio dela Torre, Dodong
Nemenzo, Karina Constantino-David, Renato Constantino Jr. and Leonor Briones. But
the Estrada-civil society affair was cut
short due to several controversies (i.e. Coco Levy Fund). Most notable of all
was the decision of some 3,000 member organizations belonging to CODE-NGO, the
National Peace Conference, and the Women's Action Network for Development
(WAND) to distance themselves from the administration, due to mass-scale
corruption and failure of Malacanang to deliver basic social services to the
poor.
A Must-Read for the Younger Generation
The volume's narratives
are sincere, straightforward and compassionate. Although the Laquians highlight
the disturbing character of the former president, they are also quick to
provide a caveat--that Estrada is not bad to the core. He was just unable to
control the external pressures which derailed his leadership. Nonetheless, the
final accountability belongs to him. The authors write:
"There are many reasons for Erap's downfall. But the
bottom line was that he just didn't have
the capabilities and discipline demanded by the Philippine
presidency. He could have the best minds
in the country to assist him but he chose to listen to the wrong people
instead." (pp. 128)
Several lessons can
be derived from this political tragedy (pp. 312-316): 1) Flagrant immorality
and lifestyle excesses are not acceptable to the Filipino people; 2) Popularity
and celebrity status are not bases for good leadership; 3) Greater public
awareness of graft and corruption is necessary to ensure accountability of
public officials; 4) The politicized role of the military is a threat to
democratic life and 5)The Philippines will continue to be mired in elite and
traditional politics despite civil society efforts.
Erap was a WYSWYG
(What You See is What You Get) president.
The "masa" loved him because of his natural transparency. On
the contrary, he is one of the biggest disappointments in Philippine political
life because he lived a double life, "rivaling, in the amount of lies
unearthed, the excesses of the Marcos dictatorship" (pp. 115). Machiavelli
could have advised Erap to voluntarily relinquish his position mainly because
"fortuna" was not kind to him. Erap attempted to hold on to power. Up
to now, he never admitted that he violated the trust of the people. History is
summoned to show that the "masa" never committed a mistake electing
him into office (because they trusted him) and likewise, never went wrong when
they decided to get rid of him from office (because Erap failed them).
As an old adage
declares, "Old people die. Young
people forget." Filipinos are known to have high tolerance of public
misconduct and corruption. May the painful lessons of the Estrada
administration and EDSA 2 be not relegated to trash bin of Philippine history. The
volume may be misconstrued as a "biased" work of a disgruntled
academic. EDSA 2, however, vindicated the Laquian couple. The book forewarns
the younger generation of the long-term
consequences of electing an incompetent president who is not only prone to
lackadaisical performance but can also be swayed by personal loyalties and
friendships.
